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State Department review completed

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2. NASR ASKS AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPORT

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[REDACTED] President Nasr told Ambassador Hare on 31 October Egypt had decided to ask for United States support against Anglo-French aggression. Nasr explained he meant military support in case of military aggression. At the time, the Anglo-French air assault had not yet taken place.

In reply to a question as to whether Egypt would turn to the USSR if this request were refused, Nasr appeared taken aback, but regained his composure and said there had been no discussion of turning to the Soviet Union. He asserted that Khrushchev in the past had suggested furnishing volunteers but Egypt had never replied.

Nasr concluded by saying he would not surrender but neither would he run away.

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5. PEIPING'S STATEMENT ON SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS



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The Peiping regime has endorsed the Soviet declaration of 30 October on relations with the Satellites, and at the same time has rebuked the USSR for its earlier mishandling of Poland and Hungary. This first Chinese Communist statement on the question supports the view that Peiping wishes to see a relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern European states of approximately the kind Peiping itself enjoys.

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In terms similar to those of the Soviet declaration, the Chinese statement describes as "completely proper" recent Polish and Hungarian demands for "democracy, independence, and equality," as well as for economic improvements. The Chinese went beyond the Soviet statement in a sharp criticism of "great-nation chauvinism" as the cause of "serious damage" to international Communist solidarity. At the same time, they cautioned the European Satellites against "reactionary elements who attempt to undermine the people's democratic system and unity among socialist countries."



6. FIRST NATO REACTION TO ANGLO-FRENCH
25X1A INTERVENTION IN EGYPT

Strong opposition to Anglo-French intervention in Egypt was expressed at a special North Atlantic Council meeting called on 31 October to discuss the Middle East situation. There was particular concern over the effect the developments might have on the NATO alliance.


Council representatives deplored the fact that action had been taken without prior consultation with other NATO partners. Most of the representatives at the meeting expressed support for the position presented by the United States. The Canadian representative regretted the British-French move because the subject was under consideration in the UN Security Council and in view of the current developments in Eastern Europe. He was supported by other members.

Apparently Britain does not envisage invocation of the North Atlantic treaty. In answer to an Italian question as to the effect from the treaty standpoint of an Egyptian attack on British or French naval vessels and aircraft in the Mediterranean, the British representative stated that the treaty was not intended to cover this particular case.

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7. BRITISH TESTING SAUDI HOLD ON DISPUTED PERSIAN 25X1A GULF ISLAND


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The British ambassador in Tehran informed the American ambassador on 31 October that an armed British detachment was to land temporarily on Arabi Island in the Persian Gulf on 30 or 31 October to check on the reported occupation by Saudi Arabia and to test the determination of Saudi personnel to remain. The detachment had instructions to fire only if necessary to cover its withdrawal.

Comment

As recently as 12 October, British officials had indicated that Britain could probably do no more than protest the Saudi occupation. The decision to move onto Arabi may be designed both to distract Saudi Arabia's attention from the Egyptian situation and to demonstrate Britain's determination to maintain all



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its Middle Eastern interests vigorously. London supports Kuwait's sovereignty over Arabi, as well as over nearby Farsi, recently occupied by Iran. These islands are important principally for offshore oil operations in the Persian Gulf. [REDACTED]

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8. SUKARNO ADMIRES MAO TSE-TUNG'S LEADERSHIP

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[REDACTED] The director of the Indonesian president's personal cabinet, Pringgodigdo, told the American ambassador in Djakarta that Sukarno is "in love with the system in China," is feeling expansive and "braver" since his return to Indonesia, and wants to pattern his leadership on that of Mao Tse-tung. He said Sukarno has not thought through the ramifications of such a role, however.

Pringgodigdo stated that he himself felt the Chinese people were happy and well fed, and that the Chinese leaders were close to the people and popular since they had brought "victory, unity, freedom, and progress."

Comment

Sukarno reportedly stated in a speech on 30 October that he had been more impressed by his recent tour to the Soviet Union and Communist China than by his earlier visit to the United States and Western Europe because in the former areas he had seen a greater vitality in social and economic progress. Although most members of Sukarno's entourage were highly impressed with China, Pringgodigdo's opinion is the most enthusiastic yet expressed by any anti-Communist who accompanied the president.

Sukarno's favorable impression of the Chinese system probably accounts for his suggestion on 28 October that political parties be abolished--an idea which has been denounced by the press and all parties except the Communists.

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